Dark patterns and UK law: how UX becomes a legal liability

TL;DR

Difficulty: Intermediate

  • In the UK three laws judge the same screen: UK GDPR (is the consent real), PECR (cookies and marketing email) and the DMCC Act 2024 (unfair selling). The ICO and the CMA enforce them.
  • A consent is free, specific, informed and a clear affirmative act. Ticked boxes, bundled purposes, shaming decline buttons and a reject option hidden one layer down all fail.
  • False limited time claims are banned outright under the DMCC Act, a countdown clock that resets misleads, and the price you show must include every fee the customer cannot avoid.
  • The real cost is rarely the fine. It is the list you have to delete and the data you cannot trust. Honest design keeps most of the reach.

A dark pattern is a screen that decides for your customer, and in the UK the law now looks at the screen itself, not just the privacy policy. I go through the common patterns one by one, show which UK rule each runs into and what the ICO and the CMA expect, and rebuild an invented Leeds tea shop's journey step by step.

The point: a dark pattern is a screen that decides for your customer

A dark pattern is a piece of design that gets a customer to do something they did not quite choose. A box that arrives already ticked. A cookie banner with a big "Accept all" and a faint "Manage settings". A pop up whose "no" button says "No thanks, I hate saving money". A countdown clock that starts again every time you reload the page.

In the UK these are not only bad manners. Three sets of law look at the same screen. The UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 decide whether a consent is a consent at all. The Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR) govern cookies and marketing email. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (the DMCC Act) decides whether the way you sell is unfair. The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) enforces the first two, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) the third, and in 2023 they wrote a joint paper on exactly this, Harmful design in digital markets.1

So this article goes screen by screen: what each common pattern is, which rule it runs into, and what I build instead, worked through on an invented shop in pounds. The law is cited, the businesses are made up. I am an engineer, not a solicitor, so take a specific dispute to one.

Three laws, one checkout page

Before the patterns, the map. "GDPR" does not cover everything on the screen, and knowing which law owns which element tells you who would come knocking.

The UK GDPR defines consent as "any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication" of the person's wishes, given "by a statement or by a clear affirmative action".2 Article 7 adds four rules: you must be able to prove the consent, a request inside a longer text must be "clearly distinguishable from the other matters", withdrawing must be as easy as giving, and tying a service to a consent it does not need counts heavily against the consent being free.3 Article 25 adds data protection by default: only the data each purpose needs.4

PECR regulation 6 says that, subject to Schedule A1, a person must not store information, or gain access to information stored, on a user's device.5 That is the cookie rule, and it covers pixels and local storage too. Schedule A1 lists the exceptions: consent, strictly necessary, and since 5 February 2026 narrow ones for first party statistics and for remembering how a visitor wants the site to look.6 Regulation 22 is the email rule: no marketing email without consent, unless the "soft opt in" for your own customers applies.7 PECR takes its definition of consent from the UK GDPR, so a consent that fails one fails the other.1

The DMCC Act's consumer chapter came into force on 6 April 2025 and opens with one sentence: "Unfair commercial practices are prohibited."8 A practice is unfair if it misleads, by action or omission, or is aggressive, in a way likely to change the average consumer's decision, if it falls short of professional diligence, if it leaves material information out of an invitation to purchase, or if it is on the banned list in Schedule 20.9 It replaced the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, which the 2023 paper still cites.1

Tap or click to open full screen and move around

Read it from the top, the way a customer moves through a shop. Each box is a screen and the law that owns it. The last box is the thread through all of them: both regimes judge the screen as a whole.

Worked example: mapping Calder Tea's checkout

Calder Tea is an invented loose leaf tea shop in Leeds, run by Hannah at caldertea.example. I use it throughout. Her journey has five elements worth mapping.

The cookie banner: PECR regulation 6, so the ICO. The "Only 3 left" badge: the DMCC Act, so the CMA, because it is a claim that drives a buying decision. The £1.50 "packing fee" at the last step: the DMCC Act again, because it is about the total price. The ticked checkout box, "Send me offers from Calder Tea and selected partners": PECR regulation 22 and the UK GDPR. The unsubscribe link that needs a login: UK GDPR article 7(3).

Five elements, three laws, two regulators. The map tells Hannah which fixes are about consent and which are about honest selling.

Strip the legal words away and a valid consent under the UK GDPR has four tests. Free: the person could say no without losing anything they came for. Specific: one purpose per yes. Informed: they knew who wanted what and why. Unambiguous: they did something, a click or a tick, that only means yes.2 The ICO's own guidance puts the consequence bluntly: there is no such thing as opt out consent, and silence, boxes ticked in advance or inactivity are not consent.10 It also wants the request "separate from other terms and conditions", and it wants "granular options to consent separately to separate purposes".10

You also have to be able to show the consent later.3 A consent you cannot evidence is, in practice, one you never had.

Worked example: the newsletter box, before and after

Hannah's newsletter form on the home page has one email field and a button labelled "Get 10% off". Underneath, in small grey type: "By signing up you agree to our terms and to receive marketing from us and our partners."

Run the four tests. Free: the discount itself is fine, the joint paper says the UK GDPR does not stop you offering an incentive.1 Specific: no, one press covers the shop terms, Hannah's emails and partner emails. Informed: barely, the partners are not named. Unambiguous: the press means "I want 10% off", not "I want partner emails". The partner consent fails, and the own marketing consent is shaky because it sits inside the terms.

The rebuild is small. The button still says "Get 10% off". Above it, one unticked box: "Email me new teas and offers from Calder Tea. Unsubscribe in one click." Partners are dropped, because Hannah has none she actually sends to. Each sign up stores the time and the exact wording shown, which is the evidence article 7 asks for.

Pre ticked boxes and other defaults

A default is whatever happens if the customer does nothing, and doing nothing is easy. The ICO and CMA paper cites a meta analysis that found a preselected option is on average 27% more likely to be chosen out of two than if there were no default.1 The paper's view is that consent taken from an unchanged default is unlikely to be valid, because the person must take a positive action.1 For cookies, the ICO's guidance says you must not pre enable technologies that need consent, and lists "legitimate interests" toggles switched on by default as bad practice.1112

There is a nuance that saves most shops, and it is worth knowing before you rip out every box. For email to your own customers, PECR has the soft opt in. You may email someone without consent if you got their address in the course of a sale, you only market your own similar products, and you gave them "a simple means of refusing" free of charge when you collected the address and in every message after.7 That route does not need a tick at all. It needs an honest chance to say no.

Worked example: what Hannah's ticked box is really worth

Hannah's checkout handles 3,000 orders a month. Her box, ticked by default, reads "Send me offers from Calder Tea and selected partners". 2,700 customers leave it ticked. Her dashboard shows a sign up rate of:

r=nyesnaskedr = \frac{n_{\text{yes}}}{n_{\text{asked}}}

where rr is the sign up rate, nyesn_{\text{yes}} is the number of customers counted as saying yes and naskedn_{\text{asked}} is the number who saw the box. It is an ordinary rate, events over opportunities, explained from scratch in Foundations: ratios and rates.

On her dashboard that is 2,700/3,000=0.902{,}700 / 3{,}000 = 0.90, a 90% sign up rate. Now ask what is defensible. As consent: nothing, because a box left ticked is inactivity, not a clear affirmative action.10 For partner offers: nothing, because the soft opt in only covers your own similar products.7 For her own teas: possibly the soft opt in, but only if the box clearly offered a way to refuse, and a ticked box that mixes in partners does not read like one.

Now the honest version. Text at checkout: "We'll email you about new teas now and then. Tick here if you'd rather we didn't." Plus an unsubscribe link in every email. That is the soft opt in, done properly. Say 10% tick the refusal box, an invented figure for the example. Then 3,000×0.90=2,7003{,}000 \times 0.90 = 2{,}700 customers can receive Hannah's own marketing, lawfully.

Same 2,700 people. The second list survives a complaint. The first has to be deleted the day somebody asks how they got on it. In the shops I have worked on, the honest box costs almost nothing in reach for your own products.

The most common dark pattern in the UK is still the banner with "Accept all" on the first layer and the refusal hidden behind "Manage settings". The joint paper calls that design harmful nudging and sludge: users must be able to refuse non essential cookies "with the same ease as they can accept them, without having to take any additional steps", so if accepting takes one click, refusing takes one click.1 Where there is an "Accept all", the ICO expects at minimum a "Reject all" with equal prominence, without nudging towards either.1 Its final guidance on storage and access technologies, published on 29 April 2026, keeps the line: refusing should be "as easy" as accepting.1113

Two more ICO details catch shops out. A banner that says "by continuing to use our website, you consent" is not consent, because it offers the visitor only an option to continue.12 And if a visitor has refused, you should not keep asking. The ICO's general guideline is that six months is a suitable time before you ask for fresh consent.11

Why do shops resist? Because the numbers move. A research team looked at the five most popular consent tools on the top 10,000 UK websites and found only 11.8% met minimal legal requirements. In a field experiment, removing the refusal button from the first page raised consent by 22 to 23 percentage points.14 The ICO says that by April 2026, 99% of the UK's top 1,000 websites met its cookie banner standard.13 In my experience the smaller shops below that list are a long way behind.

Worked example: Calder Tea's banner, before and after

Hannah's banner is shown on 80,000 visits a month. With "Accept all" and "Manage settings", 62,400 visits accept, a consent rate of 62,400/80,000=0.7862{,}400 / 80{,}000 = 0.78. After the rebuild, "Accept all" and "Reject all" sit side by side, same size, same colour, same weight, and 44,800 visits accept, a rate of 44,800/80,000=0.5644{,}800 / 80{,}000 = 0.56. These are invented numbers, chosen to sit inside the range the research found.

How big is that drop? There are two honest ways to say it, and agencies love to pick whichever sounds better.

Δpp=rnew−rold,Δ%=rnew−roldrold×100\Delta_{\text{pp}} = r_{\text{new}} - r_{\text{old}}, \qquad \Delta_{\%} = \frac{r_{\text{new}} - r_{\text{old}}}{r_{\text{old}}} \times 100

Δpp\Delta_{\text{pp}} is the change in percentage points, Δ%\Delta_{\%} is the relative change as a percentage, roldr_{\text{old}} is the consent rate before and rnewr_{\text{new}} the consent rate after. The difference between points and a percentage change is the first section of Foundations: percentages.

For Hannah: 0.56−0.78=−0.220.56 - 0.78 = -0.22, so 22 percentage points down, and −0.22/0.78×100=−28.2-0.22 / 0.78 \times 100 = -28.2, so 28.2% fewer visits that accept.

Two bars. With Accept all and Manage settings, 78% of visits accept. With Accept all and Reject all side by side and equal, 56% accept. The drop is 22 percentage points, or 28.2% in relative terms. Tap or click to open full screen and move around

The horizontal axis is the two banner designs, the vertical axis the share of visits that press accept. The takeaway: an equal banner costs Hannah a bit over a quarter of her consented traffic, and none of those lost yeses were ones she could have defended. Since February 2026 she may still count aggregate, first party statistics without consent if visitors are told and can object, though never for advertising.6 The practical setup is in my article on cookies, consent and tracking across the UK, Germany and Austria.

Confirmshaming and biased framing

Confirmshaming is making the "no" feel embarrassing. The joint paper's example is a discount pop up whose decline button reads "Nahh, I hate savings". Wording like that is likely to infringe the fairness principle, and consent obtained that way is unlikely to be freely given.1 Biased framing is the quieter cousin: one option described only by its benefits, the other only by its risks, such as "Keep my personalised experience" against "Lose my saved preferences" when the real choice is ad tracking or not. The ICO is likely to treat framing that is not fair or transparent as a breach.1

The CMA side matters too. Under the DMCC Act a misleading action includes "an overall presentation which is likely to deceive the average consumer", even when every single statement in it is true.15 A pop up made only of true sentences can still mislead as a whole.

Worked example: rewriting Hannah's exit pop up

Hannah's pop up, shown when a visitor moves to leave: headline "Wait, don't go thirsty", a green button "Yes, give me 10% off", and grey text underneath, "No thanks, I'll pay full price like a fool". The email field is in the pop up, and the small print says the address will be used "to personalise your experience".

Step one, the decline: "No thanks" as a real button, the same size as the yes. Step two, the purpose: "We'll email you your code, then new teas now and then. Unsubscribe in one click." Step three, the frequency: once per visitor, and not again for a while after a no, the same courtesy the ICO asks for with cookie banners.11 Step four, the test: Hannah runs each version for two weeks and compares sign ups still subscribed after 60 days, not raw sign ups. In my experience that is the number that pays, and the honest pop up holds up well on it.

Bundling is one yes for several purposes. "I agree to the terms, the privacy policy and marketing" in one tick. The joint paper says bundled consent is more likely to be invalid because it is unlikely to be specific and may not be fully informed, and that article 7(4) means consent should not be a condition of service unless the service needs it.1 The ICO's cookie guidance says the same for storage and access: keep each request specific to its purpose.11

My test: could the customer get what they came for and still say no to this? If not, and the thing is not needed to deliver it, it is bundled.

Worked example: a Brighton rota app's sign up screen

Rotawise is an invented staff rota tool from Brighton. Its sign up screen has an email, a password and one tick box: "I accept the terms of service and privacy policy and agree to product updates, partner offers and usage analytics." The "Create account" button stays grey until it is ticked.

Take it apart. The terms of service are a contract, which needs acceptance, not consent. The privacy policy is information, which you give, not something people agree to. Product updates are marketing and need their own choice. Partner offers need their own consent, if they exist at all. Usage analytics on the app's own pages may fall within the statistics exception, if Rotawise tells users, keeps it aggregate and offers a simple way to object.6

The rebuilt screen: a "Create account" button, a line above it, "By creating an account you accept the terms of service. My privacy notice explains what I do with your data", both linked, and one unticked box, "Email me product updates. Unsubscribe in one click." Partner offers are gone. One tick box, one purpose, and the account no longer depends on a yes it does not need.

Sludge: easy in, hard out

Sludge is friction placed on purpose on the path the business does not want you to take. Signing up takes one screen, leaving takes six and a phone call. The joint paper treats it together with harmful nudges and is careful to say that not all friction is sludge: asking someone to confirm a large bank transfer protects them.1 The test is whose interest the friction serves.

UK law attacks sludge from both sides. Article 7(3) of the UK GDPR says withdrawing consent must be as easy as giving it.3 On the consumer side, one of the things that makes a practice aggressive under the DMCC Act is when a trader "requires a consumer to take onerous or disproportionate action in order to exercise rights" in relation to a product.16 A dedicated subscription regime is in the Act too, including a duty to let consumers end a contract "in a way which is straightforward", but as I write those sections are still marked as not yet in force.17

Worked example: counting Rotawise's clicks

Count the actions both ways. Subscribing to Rotawise's product emails: tick one box at sign up, one action. Unsubscribing: click "Manage preferences" in the email, log in (two fields and a button), go to Settings, then Notifications, untick "Product updates", Save. One plus three plus three plus one: eight actions against one.

Cancelling a paid plan: Settings, Billing, "Cancel plan", a discount offer, a survey, a screen saying "Are you sure? Your team will lose their rotas", and a final button. Seven screens, against a sign up of two.

The fix: the unsubscribe link works in one click without a login. PECR already asks for a simple, free means of refusing in every marketing message,7 and a login screen is not simple. Cancelling becomes Settings, Billing, "Cancel plan", one confirmation screen with the end date, done. A retention offer can stay as one optional screen with an obvious "No, cancel my plan" button. Three screens. I would rather lose a customer cleanly than keep one who tells ten others how hard it was to leave.

Dark patterns in the buying journey: fake urgency and hidden fees

Some dark patterns are not about data but about getting the order now, at a higher price than the customer thought. Here the DMCC Act does the work.

Schedule 20 bans outright, with no test of effect, "Falsely stating that a product will only be available for a limited time" to push an immediate decision, as well as fake consumer reviews.18 Section 230 says an invitation to purchase must include the total price, and that the total price "includes any fees, taxes, charges or other payments that the consumer will necessarily incur".19 That is the end of drip pricing for unavoidable fees. A countdown clock that resets, or a "high demand" message with nothing behind it, is a misleading action in the ordinary sense.15

In the CMA's case against the mattress retailer Emma, opened in November 2022, the concerns were countdown timers, "high demand" claims and discount claims. In May 2026 Emma admitted breaking consumer law on the urgency practices and gave binding undertakings to the court.20 That case ran under the older court based rules. Since April 2025 the CMA can decide cases itself.21

Worked example: Hannah's timer and her packing fee

Hannah's product pages show "Order in the next 02:59:12 for this price" and "Only 3 left". The test takes five minutes. Open the page in a private window, note the clock, close it, open it again. The clock is back at three hours. Check the stock: 412 tins. Both claims are false, and a price that is not really ending is the kind of claim Schedule 20 names.18 The fix: show a deadline only when a real one exists, such as "Order by 2pm for dispatch today" from the courier cut off, and show stock only below a real threshold.

The packing fee. A tin is listed at £12.00. At the last step, a "packing and handling fee" of £1.50 appears that every customer pays. Total price per tin, which has to be shown from the start: 12.00+1.50=13.5012.00 + 1.50 = 13.50, so £13.50. Delivery can still be shown separately if it varies, as long as the customer is told it comes on top.19 Hannah's decision is commercial, not legal: show £13.50, or fold the packing into the price and absorb it. Either is fine. Showing £12.00 is not.

What getting it wrong costs

The fines are large on paper. Since 5 February 2026, an infringement of PECR regulation 6 or 22 carries the same higher maximum as the UK GDPR, set out in section 157 of the Data Protection Act 2018: £17.5 million or 4% of total annual worldwide turnover, whichever is higher.2223 Under the DMCC Act, the CMA can fine up to 10% of global turnover or £300,000, whichever is greater, for a consumer law infringement.24

Fmax⁡=max⁡(F0, p×T)F_{\max} = \max\left(F_0,\ p \times T\right)

Fmax⁡F_{\max} is the maximum fine, F0F_0 is the fixed amount in the law, pp is the turnover percentage and TT is the annual worldwide turnover. The max⁡\max means "whichever is higher". The percentage part is plain Foundations: percentages.

For Calder Tea, with an invented turnover of £1.2 million: under PECR, 0.04×1,200,000=48,0000.04 \times 1{,}200{,}000 = 48{,}000, below £17.5 million, so the ceiling is £17.5 million. Under the DMCC Act, 0.10×1,200,000=120,0000.10 \times 1{,}200{,}000 = 120{,}000, below £300,000, so the ceiling is £300,000. For a small business the fixed amount sets the ceiling.

Ceilings are not prices. The ICO's guidance says it reserves monetary penalties for the most serious PECR infringements,25 and the CMA said it would focus first on clear, harmful breaches such as hidden fees and objectively false information.21 In my experience the real cost comes earlier and quieter: the list that has to be deleted, the analytics nobody trusts, and the regular customer who unsubscribes because the pop up called them a fool.

A note on the regulator's name. On 30 September 2026 the office of the Information Commissioner was abolished and its functions moved to a board led Information Commission.26 It still uses the ICO name on its website,27 so I have kept "ICO" throughout.

How I audit a journey, in order

The joint paper ends with four expectations of firms: put the user at the heart of design choices, use design that empowers choice and control, test and trial design choices, and comply with data protection, consumer and competition law together.1 Here is how I turn that into an afternoon's work.

Tap or click to open full screen and move around

Top to bottom, it follows the order a customer meets the problems. The first question matters most: a banner that is decoration while the pixels have already fired is the commonest fault I find. The last box keeps the work honest.

Worked example: Hannah's audit, start to finish

Run on Hannah's shop, the audit finds seven screens: pixels firing before the banner is answered, no "Reject all", a resetting clock and invented stock, a packing fee revealed at the end, a ticked partner box, a shaming exit pop up and an unsubscribe behind a login. Each fix is the one worked through above, and most are copy and configuration, not a rebuild.

The email capture and onboarding forms have their own article, and so does the engineering of event tracking under consent mode.

Honest design is the version that lasts

A dark pattern wins the test that measures this week's sign ups and loses every other one: the complaint, the audit, the list you cannot use, the customer who notices. None of this asks you to stop persuading. A clear offer, a well placed button and a reason to sign up are all allowed. What the law asks is that the "no" is real, the price is the price and the clock is a clock. Built that way from the start, it costs less than fixing it later, and in my experience it converts better than founders expect.

Sources

If you are not sure what your banner, checkout box or exit pop up would look like to the ICO, I run a free workshop to walk your journey with you screen by screen, and the first two weeks of the fixes are on me.

Sources

  1. 1.

    Information Commissioner's Office and Competition and Markets Authority, Harmful design in digital markets: How Online Choice Architecture practices can undermine consumer choice and control over personal information, joint position paper, Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum, 9 August 2023, https://www.drcf.org.uk/siteassets/drcf/pdf-files/harmful-design-in-digital-markets-ico-cma-joint-position-paper.pdf?v=380506

  2. 2.

    UK GDPR, Article 4 (Definitions), point 11, as amended by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2016/679/article/4

  3. 3.

    UK GDPR, Article 7 (Conditions for consent), legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2016/679/article/7

  4. 4.

    UK GDPR, Article 25 (Data protection by design and by default), legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2016/679/article/25

  5. 5.

    The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, regulation 6, as substituted on 5 February 2026 by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/2426/regulation/6

  6. 6.

    The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, Schedule A1 (exceptions to regulation 6), inserted 5 February 2026, legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/2426/schedule/A1

  7. 7.

    The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, regulation 22 (use of electronic mail for direct marketing purposes), legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/2426/regulation/22

  8. 8.

    Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, Part 4, Chapter 1 (Protection from unfair trading), in force 6 April 2025, legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/13/part/4/chapter/1

  9. 9.

    Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, section 225 (Prohibition of unfair commercial practices), legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/13/section/225

  10. 10.

    Information Commissioner's Office, What is valid consent?, UK GDPR guidance and resources, ico.org.uk, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/lawful-basis/consent/what-is-valid-consent/

  11. 11.

    Information Commissioner's Office, Guidance on the use of storage and access technologies: How do we manage consent in practice?, ico.org.uk, 2026, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/direct-marketing-and-privacy-and-electronic-communications/guidance-on-the-use-of-storage-and-access-technologies/how-do-we-manage-consent-in-practice/

  12. 12.

    Information Commissioner's Office, Guidance on the use of storage and access technologies: How do we comply with the PECR rules?, ico.org.uk, 2026, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/direct-marketing-and-privacy-and-electronic-communications/guidance-on-the-use-of-storage-and-access-technologies/how-do-we-comply-with-the-pecr-rules/

  13. 13.

    Information Commissioner's Office, Final storage and access technologies guidance published, ico.org.uk, 29 April 2026, https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/media-centre/news-and-blogs/2026/04/final-storage-and-access-technologies-guidance-published/

  14. 14.

    Midas Nouwens, Ilaria Liccardi, Michael Veale, David Karger and Lalana Kagal, Dark Patterns after the GDPR: Scraping Consent Pop-ups and Demonstrating their Influence, CHI 2020, arXiv:2001.02479, 2020, https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.02479

  15. 15.

    Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, section 226 (Misleading actions), legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/13/section/226

  16. 16.

    Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, section 228 (Aggressive practices), subsection (2)(f), legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/13/section/228

  17. 17.

    Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, Part 4, Chapter 2 (Subscription contracts), including section 260, marked prospective, legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/13/part/4/chapter/2

  18. 18.

    Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, Schedule 20 (Commercial practices which are in all circumstances considered unfair), paragraphs 7 and 13, legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/13/schedule/20

  19. 19.

    Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, section 230 (Omission of material information from invitation to purchase), legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/13/section/230

  20. 20.

    Competition and Markets Authority, Emma Group consumer protection case, gov.uk, case page updated 2026, https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/emma-group-consumer-protection-case

  21. 21.

    Competition and Markets Authority, CMA to boost consumer and business confidence as new consumer protection regime comes into force, gov.uk, 7 April 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-to-boost-consumer-and-business-confidence-as-new-consumer-protection-regime-comes-into-force

  22. 22.

    The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, Schedule 1, paragraph 18 (modification of section 157 of the Data Protection Act 2018), substituted 5 February 2026, legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/2426/schedule/1

  23. 23.

    Data Protection Act 2018, section 157 (Maximum amount of penalty), subsection (5), legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/section/157

  24. 24.

    Competition and Markets Authority, How the CMA uses its direct consumer enforcement powers, gov.uk, 28 August 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-the-cma-uses-its-direct-consumer-enforcement-powers/how-the-cma-uses-its-direct-consumer-enforcement-powers

  25. 25.

    Information Commissioner's Office, Guidance on the use of storage and access technologies: What happens if we don't comply?, ico.org.uk, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/direct-marketing-and-privacy-and-electronic-communications/guidance-on-the-use-of-storage-and-access-technologies/what-happens-if-we-don-t-comply/

  26. 26.

    The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 (Commencement No. 9 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2026, S.I. 2026/1015, regulation 2, made 10 September 2026, legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2026/1015/made

  27. 27.

    Information Commissioner's Office, The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025: summary of the changes, The Information Commission, ico.org.uk, https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/what-we-do/legislation-we-cover/data-use-and-access-act-2025/the-data-use-and-access-act-2025-duaa-summary-of-the-changes/the-information-commission/